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SUBJECT: Clearance of SCAMP Personnel

TO: V/DIA

FROM: S/ASST

DATE: MAY 21 1953

REF ID: A67097

1. I realize that it is Security's business to search for, collect, and present unfavorable or discreditable information, that is, evidence or indications of loyalty or security risks, in the case of each person for whom our special type of clearance is being sought. I realize that it is not Security's business to search for, collect, and present favorable or creditable information. But it seems to me that when Security has collected the latter type of information it should give some recognition thereto and try to throw it in on the other side of the clearance scale, to counterbalance the bad. However, if nobody will agree with me on this point, then this weighing in of the "good" with the "bad" should be done by the reviewing authorities, on the echelon immediately above NSA-16, namely, the Chief of Staff, the Vice Director, and the Director. I take it that that is why these papers on Morse, Norman, and Ulan were sent to you, and it is on that basis that I make my comments below.

2. a. It appears to me that Security is overly-careless on this matter of clearance for our work. In order to indicate what leads me to this opinion, I attach hereto a detailed comment on Security's inclosures dealing with the three men mentioned above.

b. What makes me apprehensive about our clearance procedures is that we have here three cases on which we wanted more information and asked NSA-16 therefor. When we got the information I, at least, do not see too sound grounds for not going ahead with clearance. This raises the question: how about the hundreds of cases we do not see and do not ask about? Are the NSA-16 procedures and interpretations too strict, so that we lose many potentially valuable applicants for jobs? Furthermore, I am really apprehensive of what will happen to us when it becomes known that, so far as NSA-16 is concerned, membership in organizations such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Mathematical Society is considered by NSA-16 as derogatory. We are not only not going to be able to build up our staff but may, in fact, lose many competent people we now have, whose loyalty and security hitherto have been unquestioned. Many of our upper-level employees are members of these organizations; if membership in them disqualifies applicants, it will sooner or later be deemed sufficient to warrant termination of services of actual employees; the obvious precaution is to transfer or look elsewhere for employment.

3. a. In regard to Dr. Norman, who has a clearance for SECRET, I recommend going ahead with his participation in SCAMP, 1953, which requires no higher clearance.

b. I recommend, further, that in the other two cases, Morse and Ulan, we should try to get whatever waivers may really be required, to enable us to avail ourselves, in matters classified through SECRET, of their high professional qualifications.

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CONTENT NO. 2 - Continued

c. My final recommendation is that we try to get some change in attitude in NSA-16, toward greater objectivity in regard to what is to be considered incompatible with our form of government.

BENJAMIN F. FRIEDMAN
Special Assistant

1 Incl to Comment 2
Comments on D/F from SAC
to V/DIR on Clearance of
SCAMP Personnel.

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Comments on a D/F from Colonel Hyman to Admiral Hanger
on Clearance of SCAIP Personnel

1. a. The subject memorandum outlines derogatory material uncovered by NSA-16 in the course of investigation of three people: Professor Phillip Morde Horro, Dr. Morris Newman and Dr. Stanislaw H. Ulam.

b. I shall start by taking up the factual or alleged derogatory material on each of the above named individuals in turn. I shall also list some non-derogatory material on each of the three people.

2. a. Horro is a full professor at MIT; his major subject is, I believe, Physics. He has been Director of Brookhaven Laboratory, which is a research laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission. He was also the founder and first Director of the Weapons System Evaluation Group, which is now the principal Operations Analysis Group for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. NSA-16 lists Horro's associations and affiliations "with organizations who by their ideologies and public standing are known to be incompatible with the United States form of government," as follows:

(1) Massachusetts Civil Liberty Union.

My comment: While this Union has been cited by California Committee on Un-American Activities, I am not aware that it is known to be incompatible with the United States form of government. It might be, but if so, it comes as a distinct surprise to me. It is not on the list of subversive organizations cited by the Attorney General of the U.S.; nor is the American Civil Liberties Union, the parent organization, on the Attorney General's list - as yet. If we are to be guided by what any committee of any one of the 48 or 49 states feels about an organization, I do not think there will be many organizations in the U.S. that will "pass" the test.

(2) The American Soviet Science Society, Incorporated.

My comment: There is no question about this society having been cited by the Attorney General of the United States. However, at one time, during a period shortly after its founding, this society was in no way subversive. When it became clear to American scientists that this organization had been infiltrated, many scientists immediately dropped their membership. Some were even expelled. No statement is made concerning whether, in fact, Professor Horro did this, whether he is now a member, how long he

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Enclosure to
Comment 2

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was a member, etc. It seems to me to be of the greatest importance to know when, if ever, a person under investigation for clearance dropped membership in an organization which has been cited by the Attorney General of the United States. In this connection, the case of another prominent scientist, Prof. Philip Morrison, is worth thinking about, as related in the attached newspaper account (AP dispatch of 9 May 1953).

(3) The Educational Fund of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists.

My comment: There seem to be several things against Morse on account of his connection with this committee. First, he is a trustee of the Committee; next, the names of other members of the Committee are cited as those of people obviously not to be trusted. The other members mentioned are Harold C. Urey and Linus Pauling. I do not know how Harold C. Urey became a "fellow-traveler" or even how the authorities define or determine what such a traveler is, but I do know that he is a Nobel Prize winner, important contributor to the atomic bomb development, and an outspoken anti-communist. I do not know on what grounds Linus Pauling is considered a communist suspect, but I do know that he is President-elect of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States. My comment under # above, with respect to listing by a committee of one of the 48 or 49 states of the Union, also applies to the citing of the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists by the Joint Legislative Fact Finding Committee of the State of Washington.

(4) The Scientists Committee on Loyalty Problems.

My comment: Membership in this committee, cited by the House Un-American Activities Committee, may be sufficient justification for denying Morse clearance. Observe, however, that it is not stated that he is a member but only that he is a sponsor. I am not quite sure what this means and, in fact, it may be that sponsorship is worse than membership from the point of view that it may imply greater participation.

(5) I see nothing derogatory whatever in the first sentence; as to the second, a fact is a fact no matter where it appears. Why hold it against Morse that the fact was published in a well-known Communist journal?

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- (6) Same comment as applied to the first sentence of (5) above; as to the second sentence, if anything, this is an item in favor of Morse.

c. Finally, the report concludes with the statement that Morse's colleagues considered him loyal. It appears to me that of the six comments only (2) and (4) are relevant and those need further expansion. There is a quotation from USCIB #5 which states that "The person shall be of excellent character and discretion, and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States. There shall be no exception to this requirement." Professor Morse is certainly of excellent character and there has never been any question concerning his discretion. The question of his loyalty remains to be examined and it is quite possible that further investigation developing around points (2) and (4) may indicate that there is some doubt concerning his loyalty. However, on the basis of what has been presented I do not see how this conclusion was reached.

3. a. The case of Dr. Morris Hansen is considerably different from that of Professor Morse. Dr. Hansen is denied clearance for the following reasons:

- (1) His mother is not a citizen of the United States.
- (2) His wife did not list membership in a cited organization when applying for a government position. The entire facts of her suspension are not known by this Agency, at this time.

My comments: Point (1) is not at complete variance with USCIB #5, since that document merely states that a person's parents should be citizens of the United States, and not that they must be citizens of the United States. The real question is, where is his mother? Is she in the U.S. or in some country behind the iron curtain? How strictly USCIB regulations are to be interpreted is, of course, a matter for top level policy, but it is my opinion that NSA-16's interpretation is entirely too strict when it wishes to deny even a start on clearance simply because of the fact cited in point (1) above.

Point (2) is somewhat bothersome to me. It says that "The entire facts are not known by this Agency, at this time," but it appears to me that we should try to ascertain them before coming to any final conclusions. When qualified scientific personnel at this Agency make serious effort to obtain the services of qualified scientific personnel at other agencies it appears to me that NSA-16 should make every effort to get all the facts needed. In this connection it is interesting to

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note that XIA-16 states that Dr. Newman's wife had been cleared of loyalty charges; I therefore do not see why Newman's clearance should now be in question on account of his wife's clearance difficulties.

b. Dr. Newman's membership in three organizations is discussed in XIA-16's report. Even though no mention is made of these memberships in the concluding reasons for denial of clearance, it is at a loss to understand why they are mentioned at all. The first of these organizations is the American Association for the Advancement of Science. This is a completely non-political, scientific organization whose membership comprises thousands of outstanding scientists. The second organization mentioned is the American Mathematical Society. To put it mildly, it is a rather far-fetched even to hint that a person is not clearable because he belongs to this society. John von Neuman was president of this society from 1950 to 1952. Present and past members who worked at or with the Agency and who have COMINT clearance are: H. H. Coughran, W. D. Bray, C. Fullbrook, T. A. Lebler, J. J. Tacius, A. W. Gleason, Marshall Hall, S. S. Cairns, H. P. Robertson, H. T. Engstrom, C. B. Fortino, Tina Rose, and about fifty other people at the Agency. There is no comment by XIA-16, or me, on the third organization, the Mathematical Association of America. That is fortunate since this organization concerns itself primarily with the teaching of college mathematics.

c. Finally we come to the case of Dr. Stevanlou Ulan. This is the strangest case of the three. It appears to me that XIA-16 does not support its case for denying Ulan COMINT clearance by its own quotes. Under item (2) let us consider the reasons for denying clearance point by point: points (a), (b) and (c) again are questions of strict, medium, or loose interpretation of USCIB #5 and I shall not go into them. In point (d) it is stated that Ulan is not considered to be of excellent discretion and items 1d (3), 1d (4), and 1d (7) are the references. Let us look at these references in inverse order:

- (1) In 1d (7), Ulan is characterized as a talkative, sociable individual but not indiscreet and was, in fact, most circumspect regarding confidential matters. How can anyone conceivably interpret this statement as indicating that Ulan is not considered to be of excellent discretion?
- (2) In 1d (4) it is stated that Ulan "is not too discreet, although if told not to tell anything, he would not tell it." Again I fail to see how this indicates indiscretion on Agency property, since we certainly tell people not to tell secrets.
- (3) In 1d (3) it is stated that Ulan is in the interviewee's opinion somewhat indiscreet. However, this seems to be the only evidence of Ulan's indiscretion. Also it is to be noted that no account is taken of any of the good things which have

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been said about Ulan. Apparently only derogatory or possibly derogatory information is given any weight, but this may be consistent with the thesis that it is Security's business to search for derogatory evidence only.

- (4) In point 2 (e) it is stated that Ulan and wife are known to associate with a communist sympathizer. Reference is made to 1 (g). But here it is stated that Ulan and wife are closely associated with someone who is known to have associated with people of communist sympathy and who is himself suspected of sympathy with communist ideals. It is also stated that it is the informant's opinion that Ulan does not subscribe to the theories and ideas of his wife and the first associate. Note again that the negative material, no matter how slight, is given weight while the positive material is completely ignored.
- (5) Finally, in 2f it is stated that Ulan's wife is considered extra progressive and even radical in her political views. When one examines the data presented to support this claim it is again noted that the informant stated that Ulan does not subscribe to the theories and ideas of his wife.

3. a. As in the case of Hearn, there are many items collected under Ulan's name which are not included among the reasons why Ulan was denied clearance. Why were they collected or having collected them, why are they mentioned? Some of them appear to be irrelevant, some half-truths and some even support Ulan's loyalty and discretion.

b. On the basis of what NSA-16 presents it appears to me that Ulan is certainly a clearable individual, there is no question concerning clearance for Hearn, and the case of Morse merits further investigation.

c. Finally, the items regarded by Security as being derogatory raise a question as to whether Security is being realistic in its field. Some of them are relevant, some are irrelevant and some, far from being derogatory, are actually just the opposite. This would appear to indicate at least some lack of perspective on the part of Security. One may conclude that many loyal and potentially valuable people are being lost to the Agency by too-inflexible interpretations which, step by step, will soon lead to expunging membership in the American Mathematical Society with membership in truly subversive organizations such as the Communist Party of America.

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