

## MEMO ROUTING SLIP

NEVER FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS,  
CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS

1	NAME OR TITLE <i>OO [unclear]</i>	INITIALS		CIRCULATE
	ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION	DATE		COORDINATION
2	<i>OOA OOTB OOC [unclear]</i>			FILE
				INFORMATION
3	<i>04 [unclear]</i>			NECESSARY ACTION
				NOTE AND RETURN
4				SEE ME
				SIGNATURE

## REMARKS

Says who?  
See marked portion.

Approved for Release by NSA on 12-16-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

FROM NAME OR TITLE <i>[unclear]</i>	DATE <i>19 Jan 51</i>
ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION <i>OOT</i>	TELEPHONE

THE EVENING STAR, Washington, D. C. \* A-9  
TUESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1951

Constantine Brown

## New Strategy in Far East Looms

To give even an inkling at this time of what is being discussed in Tokyo between Gen. MacArthur, his top military assistants and the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff would be a real disservice to the nation's security, it is stated in quarters which know what is going on.

All that can be said at this time is that these discussions are far more important than any held in the past between the two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the high command in Tokyo. The results will be translated into actions in the near future.

These actions are the subject now of a wide range of speculation, ranging from the highly unlikely possibility of withdrawal from Korea to the launching of an invasion of the Chinese mainland by the Nationalists from Formosa.

The fact that Gen. Collins stated yesterday that replacements will be sent to American forces in Korea as soon as they are available in this country should kill any speculation that we are ready to pull out.

There is more than the usual confusion in administration quarters in Washington.

Warren Austin, chief American delegate to the United Nations, was instructed last week to change his position with respect to the cease-fire proposition, which Washington a few days earlier had declared

was wholly uncoercible. This change on the part of the State Department was due

to fear that our voting against the plan—along with Russia, her satellites and the Chinese Nationalists—would further weaken the already shaken United Nations.

Our vote for the cease-fire resolution may have been necessary from the diplomatic standpoint. But the State Department and White House immediately became aware of the unfavorable reaction among the people of this country.

Some members of Congress warned the executive branch that our acceptance of the humiliating terms of the cease-fire would be interpreted as a surrender to the Russians. Questions would be asked as to why we went into Korea and then got out with no other accomplishment than heavy loss of lives, money and prestige.

There would be no serious reaction, the administration was told, to a withdrawal from Korea because of military necessity, or for high strategic reasons. But the country certainly would reject anything that looks even remotely like surrender.

It is possible that Gen. Collins and Gen. Vandenberg, together with Washington's top intelligence men—Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Maj. Gen. Alexander Bolling, Army intelligence chief—were ordered to go to Tokyo to canvass the over-all military situation.

Personal conversations today—when the security of our codes is not absolute—are more nec-

essary than ever. On-the-spot exchanges of views regarding the capabilities of the Chinese Communists and the Soviet armies in Eastern Siberia and Manchuria—are of vital importance to the framing of immediate strategic plans.

It is probable that some of the figures available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington differ from those available to the supreme commander in Tokyo. It is also probable that the evaluation of the actual strength of these forces is different in Washington from that in Tokyo.

In the last two weeks there has been a definite trend in Washington military quarters to view the Pacific front with more interest and anxiety than previously. The possibility of Russia's committing an aggression against Japan is more in the minds of responsible officials today than in the past.

The United States Navy and Air Force are certainly big barriers to Russia in any such move. But the Soviet has an impressive submarine fleet and an adequate air force, which has not yet been in action. These two branches of Soviet armed power could lessen the danger of an amphibious and airborne operation against Japan.

These are some of the military considerations which must be gone into thoroughly by the military men before a definite strategy can be presented to the civilian officials in Washington who must make the final decision.

WASH STAR  
 ○ JAN 51

## D-Day Secrets Stolen By Spy Ring in D. C., Miss Bentley Relates

By the Associated Press

NEW YORK, Jan. 9.—Elizabeth Bentley, former Soviet spy court clerk and dagger activity in wartime Washington uncovered secret data for D-Day in Europe.

She told her story in testimony at the Federal perjury trial of William W. Remington, 39, former Commerce Department economist. He is charged with lying before a grand jury when he denied she ever was a Communist.

Miss Bentley said Remington was a member of the Communist "underground," and therefore had no party card or other credentials.

However, she said, he paid party dues to her in Washington, and gave her a "Super-Secret" formula for synthetic rubber and secret information on wartime aircraft development and production.

**Mentions Silvermaster.** Much of the testimony by Miss Bentley revolved around other espionage groups with which she said Remington was not connected.

She said one of these, allegedly headed by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, provided her with the D-Day European invasion data as well as a tip that the United States was about to break a Russian code.

Miss Bentley added that Ludwig Ullman, a former Treasury Department employe and later an Air Force officer assigned to the Pentagon, told her he obtained the D-Day information from contact in the office of Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, in charge of the War Relocation Authority.

However, she said she was quite certain that no one in Gen. Hilldring's office could have provided the information.

### Asks About Leak.

William C. Chanler, chief of defense counsel, interrupted to say he was the general's deputy at the time, and asked of the leak:

"It wasn't me, was it?"

"No, Mr. Chanler," the witness replied with a smile.

Miss Bentley also named Lauchlin Currie, a secretary to the late President Roosevelt, as an alleged member of the group she said was headed by Silvermaster.

In the past, she has labeled Mr. Silvermaster, Mr. Ullman and Mr. Currie as spy-ring contacts, but all have denied the charges.

Cross-examination by Chanler also cast light on the secrets of Communist private lives. During questioning about her one-time Communist private lives, during questioning about her one-time Communist superior, the late Jacob Golos, Mr. Chanler asked:

"You were his mistress, were you not?"

### Had Wife in Russia.

"If you care to put it that way," the witness said, and flushed. "From a Communist standpoint it was marriage."

Golos did not believe in "bourgeois marriage," she explained, and had a non-legal wife in Russia and relationships with other women here and there.

Each "had exactly the same relationship to him that I had," she added. They were married "in the Communist sense" while together, and "divorced in the Communist sense" when they parted, Miss Bentley said.

The witness said it was Golos who first introduced her to Remington.

## McCarthy Demands Army Sift Code Room in Pearson 'Leak'

Sen. McCarthy (R) of Wisconsin demanded yesterday the Army investigate its decoding room at the Pentagon to determine if top military secrets are being "leaked" to columnist Drew Pearson.

McCarthy asked Army Secretary Pace to inform him whether an investigation has been or will be made of the message center in response to charges the senator made last week.

McCarthy charged that publication by Pearson of messages allegedly transmitted from Gen. MacArthur's headquarters would help an enemy "break" the military code.

### Asks Check on Copy

McCarthy asked if publication of the messages would help the enemy even if, as Pearson said, a few words and dates were

changed.

The Wisconsin senator asked Pace to say whether Pearson had

"a verbatim decoded copy of those secret messages" and whether some official who gave them to the columnist "was not guilty of a violation of our espionage law."

McCarthy wanted to know also whether members of Congress could call at the Pentagon and see the MacArthur messages, and whether they were given to any other newsmen.

### GI Lives in Danger

McCarthy declared:

"I consider this a matter of the gravest importance.

"If someone is actually stealing our secret decoded messages from the Pentagon and sending them to Pearson, the lives of many of our young men and the security of this nation are in grave danger."

Pearson said earlier that he had permission from the Pentagon to publish the decoded secret dispatches on the condition that he change a few words and the date.

WASHINGTON, POST 6 January 1951

## McCarthy Sees 'Leak,' Asks Pearson Probe

By The Associated Press

Senator McCarthy (R., Wis.) demanded yesterday a Federal investigation to determine whether there is a "leak" of Pentagon secrets to columnist-commentator Drew Pearson.

He told the Senate that a column last week purported to quote "verbatim" top secret messages sent to the Pentagon in code.

If they were truly verbatim messages, McCarthy said, they would aid other nations in breaking United States codes and "some man in the decoding room is guilty of high treason."

Pearson immediately got out a statement saying, "Before using the Tokyo cables now compiled of, I consulted the Pentagon which assured me there would be no security risk provided the dates of the cables were changed and a few words omitted. This was done."

In his attack on the column, McCarthy did not use Pearson's name, referring to it only as a column published in The Washington Post. Similarly, in his reply, Pearson did not use McCarthy's name but referred to him as "The M. C. from Wisconsin."

But later in his speech McCarthy said Pearson recently sent a representative to his office pleading with the Senator "not to use certain photostats that I had in my office."

McCarthy said if he made them public they would expose "to the American people the kind of a man he is."

He is the mouthpiece of Moscow.

McCarthy added he would show "the photostats" to the Senate if Pearson ever sent another man to his office to threaten or talk about them.

As to this part of McCarthy's speech, Pearson said in his statement:

"At no time have I ever sent an emissary to McCarthy."

The Pearson column that McCarthy criticized concerned the size of the Chinese Communist forces in Korea. McCarthy said it described them as numbering only 96,000 men and was designed "to discredit Gen. Douglas MacArthur."

McCarthy and Pearson have been feuding for months. The feeling between them reached the point of a personal scuffle recently in a cloak room of the Sulgrave Club.